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WILL THE NEW FEDERALISM BE THE LEGACY 
OF THE REHNQUIST COURT? 
Rosalie Berger Levinson* 
Although we focus this afternoon on the Rehnquist Court, many 
have suggested that the real legacy of the Rehnquist Court is 
“O’Connorism.”  Justice O’Connor’s approach has dominated because 
she is the one who set forth the constitutional standards to govern future 
cases.  Her “undue burden” test now governs abortion,1 her 
“endorsement test,” which acknowledges that government-sponsored 
religion may threaten religious liberty, governs the Establishment 
Clause;2 and her position that affirmative action should be subject to a 
test that is strict in theory, but not fatal in fact, led a majority of the Court 
to sustain Michigan Law School’s diversity program as a necessary, 
narrowly-tailored racial preference.3  These are all rulings from which 
Justice Rehnquist dissented.  He did not succeed in overruling Roe v. 
Wade,4 eliminating affirmative action,5 or in getting prayer back into 
schools, graduation ceremonies, or football games.6  Indeed, during his 
last terms, the liberal faction prevailed in several key cases—abolishing 
the death penalty for juvenile offenders7 and striking down state sodomy 
laws8 as well as some government displays of the Ten Commandments.9 
                                            
* This speech was given on October 19, 2005, as part of a panel discussion on “The 
Legacy of the Rehnquist Court” held at Valparaiso University School of Law.  Many of the 
views expressed by fellow panelist, Notre Dame Law Professor Richard W. Garnett, who 
clerked for Justice Rehnquist during the 1995–1996 Term, are presented in his 2003 article 
entitled The New Federalism, the Spending Power, and Federal Criminal Law, 89 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1 (2003). 
1 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
2 County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (adopting Justice O’Connor’s “no 
endorsement” analysis as a general guide in Establishment Clause cases). 
3 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
4 In Casey, 505 U.S. 833, the majority refused to overrule Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).  
Subsequently, in Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 930–31 (2000), it invalidated a state’s ban 
on partial birth abortions. 
5 In Grutter, 536 U.S. 306, O’Connor delivered the opinion holding that race may be 
used as a factor in the student admissions program at the University of Michigan Law 
School because such was narrowly tailored to serve the school’s compelling interest in 
having a diverse student body. 
6 See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (holding that the school’s 
football prayer policy was invalid); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (holding that the 
inclusion of clerical members who offered prayers as part of an official school graduation 
ceremony was inconsistent with the religion clauses of the First Amendment). 
7 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (prohibiting the execution of juveniles). 
8 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (overturning a criminal sodomy statute as 
infringing fundamental privacy rights). 
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On the other hand, it cannot be denied that Justice Rehnquist 
presided over a major shift in U.S. law from the liberal Warren Court, 
and much of the conservative agenda was accomplished in the name of 
one overriding doctrine—federalism.  It is fair to say that the Rehnquist 
Court’s most contentious legacy is a series of decisions handed down in 
the name of federalism.10  Although the term refers to maintaining a 
proper balance between state and federal power, to the Rehnquist Court 
it has meant reigning in Congress and restoring power to the states.  As 
explained by Justice O’Connor, one of its key proponents, “a healthy 
balance of power between the States and the Federal Government will 
reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front . . . .  In the tension 
between federal and state power lies the promise of liberty.”11  Arguably, 
fulfilling the promise of liberty could describe the legacy of the Warren 
Court, but the Rehnquist Court decisions demonstrate that the “New 
Federalism” has not furthered this liberty-enhancing goal.  To the 
contrary, federalism has been invoked to narrowly construe 
constitutional rights and to limit Congress’ power to enact laws that 
protect individual rights. 
First, it is noteworthy that the Rehnquist Court “overturned more 
acts of Congress than all previous Supreme Courts combined.”12  This 
has been an extremely judicially active Court, and a recurring theme has 
been the need to curb Congress’ lawmaking authority.  In 1993, Justice 
Scalia taught a course on Separation of Powers, where he expressed this 
same disdain for the “800 pound gorilla,” as he not–so-affectionately 
                                                                                                  
9 McCreary County, Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 25 S. Ct. 2722 (2005) (holding that the display 
of large, framed copies of the Ten Commandments on the walls of the courthouse for an 
ostensibly religious purpose violated the Establishment Clause); cf. Van Orden v. Perry, 125 
S. Ct. 2854 (2005) (holding that the display of the Ten Commandments on the Texas State 
Capitol grounds together with seventeen other monuments and twenty-one historical 
markers did not violate the Establishment Clause). 
10 See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s 
Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429 (2002) (describing the Rehnquist Court’s 
federalism revolution); Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term:  Forward:  We the 
Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 129 (2001) (discussing the “revolution” in federalism doctrine). 
11 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458–59 (1991).  In 1971, Justice Black referred to 
“Our Federalism” as the belief that the “National Government will fare best if the States 
and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate 
ways” and the federal government should conduct itself in a manner that will not “unduly 
interfere with the legitimate activities of the States.”  Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 
(1971). 
12 Martha Neil, Cases & Controversies, 91 A.B.A. J. 38, 41 (2005) (quoting legal historian 
Joel Grossman); see also Jeffrey Rosen, The Unregulated Offensive, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2005 
(noting that between 1995 and 2003 the Rehnquist Court struck down thirty-three federal 
laws on constitutional grounds, doing so at a higher annual rate than any court in 
American history). 
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referred to Congress.13  During the Roberts confirmation hearings, a 
sharp exchange ensued between Senator Arlen Specter and nominee 
Roberts in which Senator Specter asserted that he and other members of 
Congress took umbrage at the Court’s recent treatment of congressional 
legislation.  Specter accused the Court of failing to give appropriate 
deference to congressional findings and its determinations as to what 
was in the best interests of the country.  Specter asked Justice Roberts if 
he would continue this malevolent trend.  As with so many questions, 
the nominee deftly skirted the issue.14 
The Rehnquist Court’s federalism has been invoked to restrict 
congressional authority to enact laws under two constitutional 
provisions:  the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment.  I 
will briefly discuss each in turn.  In 1995, in United States v. Lopez,15 the 
Supreme Court, for the first time in decades, struck down an act of 
Congress as falling outside of its Commerce Clause authority.  Prior to 
Lopez, the Court had explicitly stated that it had gotten out of the 
federalism business.  In the 1985 decision of Garcia v. San Antonio Metro 
Transit Authority,16 the majority ruled that if there was any limitation on 
congressional power under the Commerce Clause, it would stem from 
the political process, rather than judicial review of the result of the 
process.17  States were sufficiently represented in Congress, and thus the 
Court would not override its legislation in the name of state sovereignty.  
Justice Rehnquist dissented from this opinion, boldly asserting his 
confident belief that the principle of state sovereignty would “in time 
again command the support of a majority of this Court.”18  His 
prediction became reality with the appointments of Justice Antonin 
Scalia and later Justice Clarence Thomas.19 
The 1995 landmark Lopez case involved the validity of an act of 
Congress that prohibited possession of a gun within 1,000 feet of a 
school.  The Supreme Court, perhaps understandably, found no link 
between the possession of guns near schools and interstate commerce 
                                            
13 Justice Scalia made these remarks in a course on Separation of Powers that he taught 
in Cambridge, England, in the summer of 1993. 
14 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr., to be Chief Justice of the 
United States Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 299–302 (2005). 
15 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
16 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
17 Id. at 556. 
18 Id. at 580. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
19 Justice Antonin Scalia was appointed to the Supreme Court in 1986, the same year 
Justice Rehnquist became Chief Justice.  Justice Clarence Thomas ascended to the Court in 
1991. 
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and thus ruled the act unconstitutional, arguing that criminal law should 
be a subject for state, not federal, control.20  This decision did not really 
implicate individual liberty—by prohibiting dual layers of criminal 
sanctions, the Court did not adversely affect anyone’s individual liberty.  
Lopez, however, was alarming because many civil rights laws, including 
some criminal provisions, were enacted under the theory that Congress’ 
Commerce Clause power was plenary.  Laws prohibiting race 
discrimination in public accommodations, restaurants, and hotels,21 as 
well as laws prohibiting race, gender, and religious discrimination by 
private employers22 were enacted under the theory that discrimination 
adversely affects interstate commerce and thus may be proscribed.  The 
fear that Lopez heralded a new, narrower interpretation of Commerce 
Clause power was realized in a 2000 decision, United States v. Morrison.23  
The Court invalidated significant portions of the Violence Against 
Women Act, reasoning that Congress failed to demonstrate a sufficient 
link between domestic and other forms of violence against women and 
interstate commerce.24  Despite volumes of congressional findings 
demonstrating that violence against women may substantially deter 
women from engaging in activities that affect interstate commerce, that 
sexual assault was costing our economy billions of dollars in terms of 
lost productivity, and that states were not taking crimes against women, 
especially domestic violence, seriously, the Court found that Congress 
had no authority to enact this law.25 
The greatest challenge to individual liberty, however, came from the 
Rehnquist Court’s decisions invalidating civil rights laws enacted not 
under the Commerce Clause, but under the Fourteenth Amendment, 
which guarantees equality and due process.  The fact that Congress 
would use the Commerce Clause to enact civil rights legislation, rather 
than the arguably more appropriate and logical Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, is a historical anomaly.  A nineteenth 
century Supreme Court decision interpreted the Enforcement Clause, i.e., 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, to permit Congress to reach 
only discrimination by government and not private individuals.26  Thus, 
Congress in the 1960s turned instead to the broadly and expansively 
interpreted Commerce Clause provision.  However, when Congress 
                                            
20 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995). 
21 Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2000). 
22 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000). 
23 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
24 Id. at 618. 
25 Id. at 615. 
26 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
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seeks to hold government responsible for its own discrimination, it has 
traditionally enjoyed broad power under the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Indeed, Justice Rehnquist himself proclaimed in a 1976 decision that 
“[w]hen Congress acts pursuant to § 5, not only is it exercising legislative 
authority that is plenary within the terms of the constitutional grant, it is 
exercising that authority under one section of a constitutional 
Amendment whose other sections by their own terms embody 
limitations on state authority.”27  He observed that the Fourteenth 
Amendment “quite clearly contemplates limitations on [state] 
authority”28 and represents a “shift in the federal-state balance . . . .”29  In 
short, principles of federalism or state sovereignty that might otherwise 
be an obstacle to congressional authority evaporate when Congress seeks 
to enforce the Civil War Amendments because these amendments were 
specifically designed to expand federal power and intrude upon state 
sovereignty.   
This was the understanding until 1997.  In that year, in City of Boerne 
v. Flores,30 the Court ruled that Congress exceeded its power under the 
Fourteenth Amendment in enacting the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act of 1993.31  In this Act, Congress sought, by an overwhelming 
majority, to restore religious liberty by overturning a Supreme Court 
decision that significantly restricted the rights of religious minorities.32  
The Supreme Court had held in a 1990 ruling that the Free Exercise 
Clause guarantees no protection from “neutral” laws; no matter how 
much a state law burdened religious practices, it would be upheld 
provided it was simply rational.33  Congress sought to restore the strict 
scrutiny test previously used for laws that substantially burdened free 
exercise rights.  Despite 800 pages in the Congressional Record 
documenting the difficulty minority faiths have had in securing 
exemption from facially neutral laws, the Court ruled that Congress 
exceeded its Section 5 power.34  The Act was neither “congruent” nor 
                                            
27 Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976). 
28 Id. at 453. 
29 Id. at 455. 
30 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
31 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994), invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
32 The House voted unanimously, and all but three senators endorsed this Act.  139 
CONG. REC. S14461–01 (dailey ed., Oct. 27, 1993). 
33 Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).  Justice Scalia 
acknowledged that his rational basis test would place religious minorities at the mercy of 
the political process, but he blithely concluded that discriminatory treatment was an 
“unavoidable consequence of democratic government.”  Id. at 890. 
34 Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530–32 (discussing the extensive Congressional Record in support 
of RFRA as compared to the truncated record of the Voting Rights Act). 
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“proportionate” to the supposed remedial objective, and thus it intruded 
“into the States’ traditional prerogatives” to regulate.35   
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, as the title implies, was a 
direct slam on the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Free Exercise 
Clause of the Constitution—the majority in Boerne called it an affront to 
Marbury v. Madison36 itself.37  As so understood, Boerne could have been a 
constitutional blip, a warning to Congress that it should not pass in-
your-face restoration laws.38  However, the principle that acts of 
Congress must pass a rigid “congruent and proportionality” test 
threatened other civil rights provisions enacted under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to expand individual liberty.  Indeed, in 2000, the Supreme 
Court, for the first time in fifty years, invalidated portions of a major 
federal civil rights statute, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(“ADEA”).  It ruled that Congress exceeded its authority under Section 5 
of the Fourteenth Amendment in subjecting state employers to money 
damages for making age-biased employment decisions.39  One year later, 
Justice Rehnquist authored an opinion holding that state employees 
could not recover money damages for violation of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (“ADA”) because Congress had failed to sufficiently 
document a pattern of disability discrimination by the states so as to 
warrant this intrusion on state sovereignty.40  In enacting the ADA, 
Congress made detailed findings of pervasive discrimination against the 
disabled in both the private and public sectors, but the Court nonetheless 
held that the Act failed the congruent and proportionality test.41  
Similarly, the Court ruled that, to the extent the Violence Against 
Women Act had as its source not just the Commerce Clause, but Section 
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, it lacked the required congruence and 
proportionality, and thus it was invalid.42 
                                            
35 Id. at 533–34. 
36 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
37 Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536.  The Senate Report that accompanied RFRA strongly criticized 
Smith, contending that the framers of the Constitution recognized free exercise of religion 
as an inalienable right and that “[b]y lowering the level of constitutional protection for 
religious practices, the decision has created a climate in which the free exercise of religion is 
jeopardized.”  S. Rep. No. 103-111, at 8 (1993).  Further, the statute listed as its purpose:  
“[T]o restore the compelling interest test as set forth” in earlier decisions.  § 2000bb(b)(1). 
38 Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law:  Federal Anti-Discrimination 
Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 461 (2000) (asserting that the 
Supreme Court was clearly provoked by the temerity of Congress in enacting RFRA). 
39 Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 82–83 (2000). 
40 Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001). 
41 Id. at 374. 
42 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 626–27 (2000). 
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The whole purpose of federalism, as Justice O’Connor explained,43 is 
to ensure against federal tyranny by dividing power between state and 
federal governments.  However, if Congress is expanding individual 
rights, is there any reason to fear tyranny?  Further, federalism is 
promoted because it purportedly infuses power into state and local 
government, which is closer to the people and thus more likely to be 
responsive to their needs.  Yet, in enacting the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act, the Violence Against Women Act, the ADEA, and the 
ADA, Congress was acknowledging that the majoritarian processes on 
the state and local level had failed to be responsive to the needs of the 
aged, the disabled, religious minorities, and battered women.  The 
Court’s reliance on federalism thus appears suspect.44  Rather than being 
liberty enhancing, the decisions appear to simply promote a conservative 
agenda—the same agenda reflected in a series of decisions narrowly 
interpreting other key civil rights provisions.  Congress’ response was to 
enact the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the goal of which was to overturn 
some seven or eight Rehnquist Court rulings that had reduced 
individual protection from discrimination by narrowly construing civil 
rights laws.45  During this same time frame, the Court limited free speech 
rights of students, lessened the protection of criminal defendants, 
abdicated its role in ensuring school desegregation and prison 
improvements, increased restrictions on affirmative action programs, 
and decreased protection for minority religious beliefs.46 
                                            
43 See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
44 Professor Erwin Chemerinsky has observed that the Court’s purported concern for 
states’ rights is ignored when businesses challenge state regulation on preemption 
grounds:  “States’ rights challenges to federal civil rights laws win; businesses’ challenges 
to state business regulations win.  Civil rights plaintiffs lose and business plaintiffs win.  Is 
that really a federalism principle or is that just a description of a greatly conservative 
Court?”  Erwin Chemerinsky et al., Discussion:  A Focus on Federalism, 20 TOURO L. REV. 909, 
922 (2005). 
45 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).  Congress listed 
among its purposes for the Act, “to respond to recent decisions of the Supreme Court by 
expanding the scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order to provide adequate protection 
to victims of discrimination.”  Id. at 1071. 
46 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (holding that strict 
scrutiny, rather than the previously followed intermediate scrutiny, was the required 
standard of review for congressionally-mandated affirmative action programs); Hazelwood 
Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (holding that educators may exercise broad 
editorial control over the contents of a high school newspaper and may freely censor 
student articles based on a finding of legitimate pedagogical objectives); see also Rosalie B. 
Levinson, The Dark Side of Federalism in the Nineties:  Restricting Rights of Religious Minorities, 
33 VAL. U. L. REV. 47 (1998) (arguing that federalism has been used to restrict the rights of 
religious minorities). 
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There was only one ruling in which the Court ignored federalism, 
purportedly in favor of individual rights.  The Rehnquist Court did step 
in to stop Florida from performing a recount of presidential ballots, 
thereby handing George Bush the White House.47  As the dissent opined 
in Bush v. Gore,48 “[w]ere the other members of this Court as mindful as 
they generally are of our system of dual sovereignty, they would affirm 
the judgment of the Florida Supreme Court.”49  They would have 
followed the core federalism principle that mandates deference to state 
courts on matters of state law.  Georgetown University Law Professor 
Mark Tushnet has commented:  “From the public point of view and from 
the historian’s point of view, it’s almost certain that Bush v. Gore will be 
the case of the Rehnquist court.”50  If the partisan split in Gore is the 
legacy of the Rehnquist Court, it is a legacy that has likely contributed to 
what has been described as a crisis in the judiciary.  Recently released 
public polls show that the majority of Americans lack confidence in the 
integrity and independence of the Court.51  Proposals have circulated 
that would eliminate life tenure in favor of fixed terms for federal judges, 
including Supreme Court Justices, because they have blithely ignored 
their own precedents and principles.52  But I will leave this discussion for 
another day. 
So is the New Federalism the legacy of the Rehnquist Court?  Two 
years ago I would have ended my remarks on federalism at this point.  
However, as my students know, interpretation of the Constitution is an 
evolving process, and a few recent decisions suggest that the New 
Federalism may already be waning, both as a restriction on Congress’ 
power under the Fourteenth Amendment and under the Commerce 
Clause.  In a 2003 decision, Justice Rehnquist himself rejected the 
federalism argument and ruled that Congress acted within its authority 
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in subjecting state 
                                            
47 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 142–43 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
50 Joan Biskupic, Rehnquist Left Supreme Court with Conservative Legacy, USA TODAY, Sept. 
9, 2005, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/judicial/supremecourt 
justices/2005-09-04-rehnquist_legacy_x.htm (quoting Professor Mark Tushnet).  
51 Martha Neil, Half of U.S. Sees “Judicial Activism Crisis,” A.B.A. J. EREPORT, Sept. 30, 
2005, http://www.abanet.org/journal/ereport/s30survey.html.  The survey reported that 
a majority agreed with the statement that “‘judicial activism’ ha[d] reached the crisis stage, 
and that judges who ignore voters’ values should be impeached.”  Further, nearly one-half 
agreed with a congressman who said judges are “arrogant, out-of-control and 
unaccountable.” 
52 See Benjamin Wittes, Without Precedent, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Sept. 1, 2005, at 39. 
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employers to damage actions under the Family Medical Leave Act.53  
Justice Rehnquist viewed this as a valid prophylactic measure intended 
to eliminate gender-based discrimination in the workplace, and he ruled 
that the Act met the stringent congruence and proportionality test.   
Federalism was rejected in two other decisions, although both were 
over Justice Rehnquist’s dissent.  One case again involved the ADA.  As I 
noted, the Supreme Court ruled that state employers could not be sued 
for violating the ADA.  Nonetheless, in Tennessee v. Lane,54 it held that the 
ADA was a valid exercise of Congress’ power as applied to cases 
implicating the fundamental right of access to the courts.  Thus, a 
paraplegic who was denied wheelchair access to a second story 
courtroom in a Tennessee building that lacked an elevator could sue the 
state for damages.  The ADA trumped state sovereignty because court 
access is a fundamental right.55   
In a second case rejecting federalism, the Court ruled that Congress 
had authority under the Commerce Clause to criminalize the possession 
of marijuana even when grown within a state for personal, in-state 
medicinal use.56  The federal criminal drug law came into direct conflict 
with California’s medical marijuana statute.  Despite arguments that 
imposition of the federal drug laws in this context invaded states’ rights 
and that any link to interstate commerce was too attenuated, the majority 
turned to the more traditional understanding of the Commerce Clause to 
sustain the law.  It reasoned that Commerce Clause authority included 
the power to prohibit the local cultivation and use of marijuana, even as 
applied to the troubling facts of this case where seriously ill patients 
would suffer significant harm.57  In a bizarre twist, the dissenting 
conservatives lamented the betrayal of federalism—they would not have 
allowed federal agents to raid the homes of sick people and seize their 
homegrown marijuana.58  Obviously, the liberal Justices felt that 
sustaining Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause was 
paramount, despite this compelling picture of government invading 
individual liberty. 
                                            
53 Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003). 
54 541 U.S. 509 (2004). 
55 Id. at 532–34. 
56 Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005). 
57 Id. at 2209. 
58 Justice O’Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, dissented.  Id. 
at 2220–39. 
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Notwithstanding these new cases, I believe the reports of the demise 
of the New Federalism are a bit premature.  The 800 pound gorilla will 
not roam freely, nor will Congress have unbridled authority.  Difficult 
questions regarding federalism and the proper role of Congress in 
enacting laws under the Commerce Clause and under Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment remain—indeed the Roberts Court faces some 
of these questions this term.59  I have no doubt that the Rehnquist 
Court’s federalism legacy will continue to influence the debate on these 
pending cases and on future cases for years to come. 
                                            
59 In Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 1299 (2005), the 
Court will determine whether the Attorney General permissibly construed the Controlled 
Substances Act to prohibit distribution of federally controlled substances for purposes of 
facilitating an individual’s suicide, despite state law purporting to authorize such 
distribution.  [Subsequent to the date of this lecture, the Court found that the Attorney 
General lacked authority under the Controlled Substances Act.  126 S. Ct. 904 (2006).]  In 
Goodman v. Georgia, 120 Fed. App’x 785 (11th Cir.), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 2266 (2005), the 
Court will decide whether the ADA was a proper exercise of Congress’ power as applied to 
the administration of state prison systems, such that inmates with disabilities may sue for 
damages to rectify discrimination by state-operated prisons. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 40, No. 3 [2006], Art. 2
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol40/iss3/2
